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Abstract 
Management of livestock diseases is important in ensuring food safety to consumers in both 
domestic and export markets. Various measures are prescribed under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Standards (SPS) agreement of the World Trade Organization. In order to prevent spread of trans-
boundary cattle diseases, the SPS agreement recommends establishment of Disease Free Zones 
(DFZs). These have been implemented successfully in some major beef exporting countries, but in 
Kenya are still at a pilot stage. To understand Kenyan farmers’ preferences on the type of DFZ that 
would be readily acceptable to them, a choice experiment was conducted using a D-optimal design. 
Results show that farmers would be willing to pay to participate in a DFZ where: adequate training 
is provided on pasture development, record keeping and disease monitoring; market information is 
provided and sales contract opportunities are guaranteed; cattle are properly labelled for ease of 
identification; some monetary compensation is provided in the event that cattle die due to severe 
disease outbreaks. Preferences for the DFZ attributes are shown to be heterogeneous across three 
cattle production systems. We also derive farmers’ preferences for various DFZ policy scenarios. 
The findings have important implications for policy on the design of DFZ programmes in Kenya 
and other countries that face similar cattle disease challenges. 
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1 Introduction 
Production and trade in cattle is an important source of livelihood for many people in various parts 
of the world, including Kenya where the livestock sector contributes about 42 percent of total 
agricultural output (KIPPRA, 2009). However, frequent outbreaks of trans-boundary cattle diseases 
in the country, especially Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), often cause considerable losses (Otieno, 
2008). Disease-endemic status, in addition to other supply-side constraints, means that Kenya has 
lost major export markets for beef (e.g., Japan) and is unable to utilise preferential market access to 
the European Union (EU) (Gitu, 2005). Disease control is also of considerable concern to the 
domestic market to safeguard consumers from food-borne illnesses and to enable traders to expand 
sales in middle and high income population segments (Narrod et al., 2008). 
In order to contain the spread of four main trans-boundary cattle diseases that the World 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE) officially recognises as being of considerable economic 
importance - FMD, Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia (CBP), Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE) and Rinderpest - various measures are prescribed under the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO). With regard to 
food safety in livestock trade, the SPS agreement recommends establishment of Disease Free Zones 
(DFZs) (WTO, 1995a). A DFZ may be described as a programme whereby an area or country is 
demarcated into sub-units on the basis of the level of cattle disease incidence with various disease 
control strategies being applied in the different sub-units. Disease zoning or regionalisation may be 
used to separate a diseased area in an otherwise disease-free country, or as a way to secure a 
disease-free area in an otherwise infected country (Zepeda et al., 2005). In order to ensure that the 
DFZ is effective in assuring a safe and more stable beef supply, producer compliance with 
regulations is mandatory. Otherwise, the demarcation may create a price differential and provide an 
incentive for farmers to smuggle cattle from a lower-priced infected region to a higher-priced 
disease-free area during a disease outbreak. This may lead to eventual collapse of the DFZ 
programme (Loppacher et al., 2006).  
As a disease control strategy, DFZs have been successfully implemented in some major beef 
exporting countries such as Australia, Botswana, Brazil and Namibia. In Kenya, however, the 
design of DFZs is still at a pilot stage and focuses mainly on rehabilitation of previous livestock 
holding grounds, upgrading of abattoirs and separation of wildlife from livestock ranches (Republic 
of Kenya, 2008). Information on farmers’ preferences on the features that they would like to be 
included in a DFZ is useful to policy-makers on two grounds: to enable assessment of potential 
acceptability of the DFZ programme; to provide insights on some of the issues that may affect 
implementation of the DFZ, especially considering differences in production systems and relative 
resource endowments between farmers in Kenya and elsewhere.   
We use a choice experiment (CE) (Louviere, 2001) to investigate farmers’ preferences for 
key attributes in the design of a DFZ policy.  A CE is a stated preference approach for ex-ante 
analysis of preferences for goods/services (e.g., DFZs) that are not yet in the market and would 
therefore not be possible to evaluate using revealed preference methods (Louviere et al., 2000). 
Furthermore, CE is preferred over other stated preference techniques, such as contingent valuation 
(CV) (Mitchell and Carson, 1989), because it enables evaluation of trade-offs for various 
components (attribute levels) of a good/service rather than the good/service per se (Hanley et al., 
2001).  
Choice experiments have been applied to value quality changes in environmental attributes 
(e.g. Adamowicz et al., 1998; Willis et al., 2002), to estimate farmers’ preferences for genetic 
attributes of indigenous livestock (Roessler et al., 2008; Ruto et al., 2008), and to investigate cow-
calf producer preferences for alternative voluntary traceability systems (Schulz and Tonsor, 2010). 
A notable development is in the use of CEs to inform the design of policies or programmes (Hanley 
et al., 2003; Ruto and Garrod, 2009; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010). Following this approach, we 
employ a CE to estimate beef cattle farmers’ preferences for key elements of DFZ policy design 
and, particularly, to investigate the trade-offs that farmers are willing to make between various 
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attributes of the DFZ. To the best of our knowledge, such an analysis has not been addressed in the 
literature.  
The remainder of the paper is organized in four sections. Section two discusses the CE 
design and data collection approach. In section three the choice model applied in data analysis is 
presented, while the fourth section reports the findings of the study. Some key conclusions are 
offered in section five. 
2 Choice experiment design and data collection 
2.1 Choice experiment design 
We conceptualise DFZs to have two types of attributes or features: compulsory; optional or 
voluntary. The compulsory attributes are those that must be adhered to by all farmers in the DFZ 
and all other people living in the neighbourhood (but not necessarily members of the DFZ), in order 
to prevent spread of diseases. The compulsory features are necessary to enforce public policy 
(Olson, 1965) and include: controlled grazing; regular monitoring and prompt reporting of disease 
occurrence to veterinary officers; no movement of animals to or from a DFZ during a disease 
outbreak; slaughter and safe disposal of all infected cattle in case of an outbreak. The optional or 
voluntary features are those that allow farmers some choice and are the ones that enter the CE 
design. These features enable individuals with diverse interests to exercise collective action, which 
Ostrom (1990) notes is necessary when individuals face a common problem, such as cattle disease, 
that may threaten their collective livelihoods.  
Our CE design process began with identification of policy-relevant DFZ features through a 
review of the literature on DFZ implementation in other countries (for example, see Mapitse, 2008), 
in-depth interviews of key officials of the Ministry of Livestock Development in Kenya, and focus 
group discussions with farmers. Following guidelines proposed by Bateman et al. (2002), the focus 
group discussions were also used to validate important attributes identified and their levels for 
inclusion in the CE. Five DFZ attributes were selected for the CE design from the validation 
exercise: training of farmers on pasture development, monitoring and reporting of disease 
occurrence; provision of market support; compensation to farmers; labelling of cattle for ease of 
traceability; an annual membership fee (cost) per animal. 
Due to differences in levels of access to livestock extension and veterinary advisory services 
in Kenya, it was envisaged that some farmers would need training in order to fully comply with the 
compulsory DFZ requirements, such as disease monitoring and reporting. Moreover, provision of 
market support would enable farmers to earn better incomes and sustain their long term 
participation in the programme. A compensation scheme (in case of a fatal disease outbreak) would 
act as an incentive to boost farmers’ participation.2 The maximum level of compensation used in the 
study (50 percent of the value of cattle lost) is consistent with the allowable domestic farm support 
measures in articles 7 and 8 of Annex 2 (the green box) in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
(AoA). In the AoA, compensation of farmers for losses of income or livestock from natural 
disasters e.g., disease outbreaks, should not exceed 70 percent (WTO, 1995b). Labelling of cattle is 
considered important for enhancing traceability. Finally, payment of a membership fee would 
guarantee farmers’ access to veterinary drugs and services in the DFZ at all times without any extra 
charges, and would also enhance financial sustainability of the programme, given that governments 
in developing countries such as Kenya are unlikely to be able to provide full funding for DFZs. 
Following recommendations from the focus group discussions, three levels were used for each of 
the five DFZ attributes, except training for which only two levels were used (Table 1).  
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Table 1: Attributes included in DFZ choice experiment design 
DFZ attribute Attribute levels 
Training 
 
No Training 
Training is provided 
Market support 
 
No market support 
Market information is provided 
Market information is provided and contract sale is guaranteed 
Compensation 
 
10 per cent of the value of cattle lost 
25 per cent of the value of cattle lost 
50 per cent of the value of cattle lost 
Labelling of cattle No labelling 
Labelling cattle without owner’s identity 
Labelling cattle with owner’s identity 
Annual membership fee per 
animal (in Kenyan shillings; 
Kshs) 
150 
300 
450 
 
 
In CE design, different experimental procedures can significantly influence the accuracy of 
the results. Generally, it is important to use an experimental design approach that maximises an 
efficiency criterion (such as D-efficiency), or equivalently, minimises an error criterion such as the 
D-error. A design is said to be D-efficient or D-optimal if it has a sufficiently low D-error or yields 
data that enable estimation of parameters with low standard errors (see Scarpa and Rose, 2008 for 
details). Given the large geographical scope of the study and the cost of surveys of this kind, sample 
size was also an important issue. To increase sampling efficiency, we focused on maximising the D-
optimality through a two-stage design procedure (Bliemer and Rose, 2010). First, a conventional 
fractional factorial orthogonal design was used in a preliminary survey of 36 farmers to obtain prior 
coefficients. These priors were then used in the second stage to generate an efficient design, which 
had a relatively good level of D-optimality (i.e., D-efficiency measure of 85 percent). In addition, 
the design had good utility balance (i.e., a B-estimate of 77 percent), which indicates there was an 
insignificant likelihood of dominance by any alternative in the choice situations (Huber and 
Zwerina, 1996). The final design had 24 paired choice profiles that were randomly blocked into six 
sets of four choice tasks. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the six sets. Each choice 
task consisted of two alternatives (A and B) and a baseline alternative (C) in which all DFZ 
attributes were set at the ‘zero level’. When making choices, respondents were asked to consider 
only the attributes presented in the choice tasks and to treat each choice task independently. An 
example of a choice set presented to respondents is shown in Figure 1. Overall, our design, 
generated using the statistical software NGENE (ChoiceMetrics, 2009), is in line with the optimum 
CE design dimensions discussed in Caussade et al. (2005). Pilot testing of the CE questionnaire was 
conducted through face-to-face interviews of a further 36 farmers to refine its wording and format. 
The pilot survey showed that respondents could comfortably handle at least four choice tasks. 
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Figure 1: Example DFZ choice set 
We would like you to choose your most preferred type of DFZ from the following three 
alternatives. 
DFZ Attribute Alternative A Alternative B Alternative C 
Training Training is 
provided 
No training No training 
Market support No market support Market information 
and contract 
No market 
support 
Compensation  25% 10% No compensation 
Labelling Cattle and owner No labelling No labelling 
Annual membership fee (Kshs) 150 450 No membership 
fee 
Which ONE would you 
prefer?  
   
 
2.2 Data collection 
The study was conducted in four sites (Kajiado, Kilifi, Makueni and Taita Taveta districts) that are 
representative of Kenya’s three main cattle production systems: nomadic pastoralism; agro-
pastoralism; ranches. Nomadic pastoralists generally migrate seasonally with cattle in search for 
pasture and water. They are less commercialised, but derive a relatively large share of their 
livelihood from cattle and other livestock. In contrast, the agro-pastoralists are sedentary; they keep 
cattle and other livestock, besides cultivating various crops, and are fairly commercialised. 
Ranchers are also sedentary and operate purely commercial livestock enterprises; they may also 
grow crops for use as on-farm fodder or for sale (Omiti and Irungu, 2002). Whereas the ranchers 
mainly use controlled grazing on their private land, the nomads and agro-pastoralists generally 
practice an open grazing system, which tends to cause conflicts with other land users when cattle 
encroach on private or public protected land. Recently, many conflicts arising from encroachment 
have led to confiscation of cattle or penalties such as fines (Obunde et al., 2005). It is important to 
understand how different grazing systems might influence preference for DFZ attributes, 
particularly labelling of cattle (which would indirectly deter trespass). In addition, differences in 
relative disease incidence might also explain preferences for DFZ features in the three production 
systems. Cattle disease incidence generally varies with the level of migration and, in Kenya, is 
estimated to be 60 percent, 40 percent and 25 percent in nomadic, agro-pastoral and ranch systems, 
respectively (Maloo et al., 2001). The areas sampled in the study represent different agro-ecological 
zones, but are contiguous, hence logistically more accessible.  
A multi-stage cluster (area) sampling approach (Horppila and Peltonen, 1992) was used. 
Within the four districts, smaller administrative units (divisions) were randomly selected from lists 
of all divisions in these districts, taking into account the general distribution of cattle in the study 
area. Subsequent stages involved a random selection of a sample of locations, from which a number 
of smaller units (sub-locations) were selected. The primary sampling units for the survey were 
therefore restricted to 40 sub-locations. Systematic random sampling was used to select individual 
respondents for interview during the survey. With the assistance of local interviewers experienced 
in surveys, the CE questionnaire was administered through face-to-face interviews of farmers in 
local languages between July and December 2009. A random route procedure (for example first left, 
next right, and so on) was followed by the interviewers to select every fifth or tenth farmer, in 
sparsely or densely populated sub-locations, respectively. In total, 313 farmers, including 66 
ranchers, 110 nomadic pastoralists and 137 agro-pastoralists, were interviewed.  
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3 Model specification 
The conceptual framework of a CE derives from Lancaster’s theory of consumer choice (Lancaster, 
1966) which postulates that preferences for goods are a function of the attributes of the goods rather 
than the goods themselves. The analysis of CE data follows the behavioural framework of random 
utility theory (McFadden 1973; Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985), which describes discrete choices in 
a utility maximising framework. We apply the random parameter logit (RPL) model in the 
analysis
3
.  
The RPL (also called mixed logit model) provides a flexible and computationally practical 
method for analysing results from CE surveys (McFadden and Train 2000; Train 1998). The model 
addresses three limitations of the standard multinomial logit (MNL) model by allowing: (a) random 
taste variation and hence explicitly accounting for heterogeneity in preferences; (b) unrestricted 
substitution patterns; (c) dependence across a panel of repeated choices made by the same 
respondent, which captures correlation in unobserved factors that affect individual utility. The RPL 
is also not subject to the strong assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property 
(Hausman and McFadden, 1984) inherent in the standard MNL. The specification and estimation of 
the RPL model follows Revelt and Train (1998), to which the reader is referred for detail.  
Each respondent is presented with a series of T=4 choices. In each choice set, a respondent 
faces a choice between J=2 alternatives (plus a baseline option). Thus, the three alternatives that the 
respondent faces in a particular choice set comprise two DFZ policy options described in terms of 
key design attributes (training, market information, compensation, etc.) and the option in which 
none of the attributes is available. The attributes of alternative i in choice occasion t faced by 
respondent n are collectively labelled as vector Xint. The utility obtained by individual n from 
alternative i in choice situation t is expressed as: 
intintint   XU n          (1) 
where the coefficient vector for each respondent βn is unobserved and varies in the population with 
a density function f(βn│θ), whereby θ are the parameters of this distribution. εint is an unobserved 
random term assumed to be identically independently distributed (IID) Type I extreme-value. 
Conditional on βn, the probability that individual n chooses alternative i in choice situation t is given 
by the standard MNL model: 
 
 


Cj
jntn
n
n
X
X
L



exp
exp
)( intint         (2) 
Let i(n,t) denote the alternative chosen by individual n in choice situation t. The probability of 
individual n’s observed sequence of choices (conditional on βn) is simply the product of the 
standard MNL model assuming that the individual tastes, βn, do not vary over choice situations in 
repeated choice tasks (though are assumed heterogeneous over individuals): 

t
nnn LG )()( int            (3) 
The unconditional probability for the sequence of choices made by individual n is expressed as: 
 nnnnn dfGP  )()()(         (4) 
Two sets of parameters are noteworthy in this expression: βn is a vector of parameters specific to 
individual n (representing the individual’s tastes, which vary between respondents) and θ are 
parameters that describe the distribution of the individual-specific estimates (such as the mean and 
covariance of βn). The objective in RPL is to estimate the θ. This is usually done through simulation 
                                                 
3
 Either the RPL or latent class model (LCM) could be used to investigate preference heterogeneity. There are no 
theoretical grounds for the choice of one over the other (Greene and Hensher, 2003). We explored both approaches, but 
found the RPL to fit the sample data better. 
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of the choice probability (because the integral in Equation 4 cannot be computed analytically due to 
the lack of a closed mathematical form). The log-likelihood function is specified as: 
 n nPLL )(ln)(           (5) 
The Pn(θ) is approximated by a summation over randomly chosen values of βn. For a selected value 
of the parameters θ, a value of βn is drawn from its distribution and Gn(βn), i.e., the product of the 
standard MNL model, is computed. Repeated calculations are done for several draws and the 
average of the Gn(βn) is considered as the approximate choice probability: 
  rn
R
r
nn G
R
SP 








1
1
)(         (6) 
where R is the number of draws of βn, βn
r│θ
 is the r-th draw from f(βn│θ) and SPn is the simulated 
probability of individual n’s sequence of choices. Following Train (2003), the simulation was based 
on Halton intelligent draws, which has been shown to yield more accurate results compared to 
independent random draws. Up to 100 Halton draws were used in the simulations. The simulated 
log-likelihood function is constructed as: 
  n nSPSLL )(ln)(          (7) 
The estimated parameters are those that maximize SLL (θ). Trade-offs between DFZ attributes and 
money, i.e., the marginal willingness to pay (WTP), are computed as (Hanemann, 1984): 









p
kWTP


*1          (8) 
where βk is the estimated coefficient for an attribute level in the choice set and βp is the marginal 
utility of income given by the coefficient of the farmer’s membership fee (cost attribute). The 
marginal WTP (implicit price) for a discrete change in an attribute provides a measure of the 
relative importance that respondents attach to attributes within the DFZ design. Finally, the overall 
WTP or compensating surplus (CS) welfare measure can be obtained for different DFZ policy 
scenarios associated with multiple changes in attribute levels as:  
)(
1
01 VVCS
p




         (9) 
where V1 represent the value of the indirect utility associated with attributes of the DFZ scenario 
under consideration, while V0 is the indirect utility of the baseline scenario of no DFZ. 
 
4 Results and discussion 
4.1 Farmer characteristics 
Descriptive results show that ranchers, on average, have much larger herds and farms than the 
nomads and agro-pastoralists. However, a high proportion of each type experiences disease-related 
cattle losses; about three-quarters for nomads and ranchers and half for agro-pastoralists (Table 2). 
As a consequence, a DFZ may be a beneficial intervention. In addition, it might be expected that the 
high disease incidence in nomadic systems, and the greater losses incurred by both nomads and 
ranchers from diseases, would lead to higher preference for DFZs by these two groups.  
Currently, ranchers benefit from relatively better access to livestock extension and 
veterinary advisory services, and have significantly higher household incomes, than nomads and 
agro-pastoralists. In common with the nomads, they depend more heavily on cattle as the main 
source of income and tend to keep indigenous (local) cattle breeds such as the Zebu and Boran, 
which are relatively well adapted to dry areas.  In contrast, the agro-pastoralists have a majority of 
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exotic and crossbreeds. In terms of main market outlet, between a half (nomads) and three-quarters 
(ranchers) of farmers opt for slaughterhouses in preference to open air markets, neighbours or other 
channels (Table 2). Across all three production systems, a higher proportion of farmers use 
slaughterhouses for their indigenous cattle than for their exotic and crossbreeds; this difference is 
most noticeable for the nomads.  
There is no significant difference in the average age of agro-pastoralists and ranchers, but 
generally farmers in both categories are slightly older than the nomads. Across all three production 
systems, less than 40 percent of respondents have formal education at the secondary level or above 
(Table 2). 
 
 
Table 2: Sample characteristics 
Characteristic Nomads 
(n = 110) 
Agro-pastoralists 
(n = 137) 
Ranchers 
(n = 66) 
Pooled sample 
(n = 313) 
Average herd size 53.1
b
 11.4
c
 150.9
a
 55.5 
Average farm size (acres) 84.1
b
 9.5
c
 426.5
a
 123.6 
Loss of cattle from diseases (% of 
farmers affected in the past year) 
74.5
a
 49.6
b
 72.7
a
 63.3 
Access to livestock extension 
services (% of farmers) 
49.1
b
 35.8
c
 77.3
a
 49.2 
Access to veterinary advisory 
services (% of farmers) 
50.0
b
 51.8
b
 87.9
a
 58.8 
Percentage of farmers who derive 
more than half of income from cattle 
78.2
b
 36.5
c
 93.9
a
 63.3 
Main cattle breed is indigenous (% of 
farmers) 
68.2
a
 27.0
c
 54.5
b
 47.3 
Slaughterhouse as main market outlet 
(% of farmers) 
49.1
c
 64.2
b
 77.3
a
 61.7 
Sale of indigenous breed in 
slaughterhouses (% of farmers) 
80.0
a
 67.0
a
 80.0
a
 72.1 
Sale of exotic or crossbreeds in 
slaughterhouses (% of farmers) 
34.7
c
 56.8
b
 75.0
a
 50.0 
Monthly household income above 
Kshs 20, 000 (% of farmers)  
22.7
b
 15.3
b
 84.8
a
 32.6 
Average age of respondent (years) 38.6
b
 42.4
a
 42.1
a
 41.0 
Secondary education and above (% of 
farmers) 
30.0
a
 38.7
a
 34.8
a
 34.8 
a,b,c
 differences in the superscripts denote significant differences (at 10% level or better) across the 
production systems. 
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4.2 Empirical Estimation 
The variables used in the DFZ analysis and their coding are shown in Table 3. A likelihood ratio 
test shows that parameters are not equal across production systems.
4
 The utility parameters for all 
DFZ attributes were entered as random parameters assuming a normal distribution, except the cost 
attribute which was specified as fixed so as to facilitate estimation of the distribution of WTP, by 
eliminating the risk of obtaining extreme negative and positive trade-off values (Revelt and Train, 
1998; Campbell et al., 2010). 
 
Table 3: Description of variables used in the choice analysis 
Variable Description 
TRAIN Training is provided (1 = Yes; 0 otherwise) 
MKI Market information is provided (1 = Yes; 0 otherwise) 
MKIC Market information is provided and sales contract is guaranteed (1 = Yes; 0 
otherwise)  
COMPEN Compensation (10%, 25% or 50%)  
LABC Label cattle only (1 = Yes; 0 otherwise) 
LABCO Label cattle with owner’s identity (1 = Yes; 0 otherwise) 
COST Annual membership fee per animal (150, 300 or 450) 
 
 
Results of the RPL models for the three production systems and the pooled sample are 
reported in Table 4. Farmers prefer training on pasture development, monitoring and reporting of 
cattle diseases. This result may capture farmers’ lack of satisfaction with the current livestock 
extension service provision system and also corroborates the suggestion by Irungu et al. (2006) that 
livestock farmers prefer community-based animal health workers because of a high proportion of 
poorly trained veterinary officers in remote areas of Kenya. As expected, preferences for the market 
support attributes are fully consistent with the choice axiom of transitivity; market information and 
contract is preferred to market information only or to no market support. The estimated coefficient 
for compensation is also positive, as expected, and significant. There is a higher preference for 
labelling cattle without, rather than with, the owner’s identity. This might be due to farmers’ fear of 
penalties (e.g., fines) that are normally imposed on those who practice open grazing and encroach 
on private or public protected farms. However, as noted by Schulz and Tonsor (2010), acceptance 
of a complete system of cattle labelling by most farmers would be useful for verification of animal 
health, as well as for market access purposes. The parameter estimate for farmers’ annual 
membership fee (COST) is significant with the expected negative sign, which permits computation 
of trade-offs between each attribute and money.  
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 The likelihood ratio (LR) statistic is calculated as -2{L(pooled) – (L1+L2+L3)} where L(pooled) is the value of the log 
likelihood function for the pooled sample, while L1, L2 and L3 are the values of the log likelihood for the sub-samples 
(nomads, agro-pastoralists and ranchers, respectively). The LR statistic is distributed chi-square with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of parameters estimated. The test strongly rejects the hypothesis that the parameters are 
equal across the three production systems, with a LR statistic of 68.54 compared to the chi-square critical value of 18.48 
at 1% level and 7 degrees of freedom. All the model estimations were carried out using LIMDEP version 9.0/NLOGIT 
version 4.0 software (Greene, 2007). 
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Table 4: Random parameter logit estimates for DFZ attributes 
Variable Coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
Nomads Agro pastoralists Ranchers Pooled sample 
TRAIN 4.85 (5.76)*** 6.67 (5.47)*** 5.11 (3.97)*** 4.36 (9.69)*** 
MKI 3.11 (4.64)*** 4.38 (5.34)*** 3.27 (3.09)*** 3.01 (7.83)*** 
MKIC 3.78 (4.90)*** 5.03 (5.18)*** 5.31 (3.73)*** 3.50 (8.76)*** 
COMPEN 0.06 (3.93)*** 0.06 (3.53)*** 0.06 (3.05)*** 0.05 (6.28)*** 
LABC 2.27 (2.77)*** 0.46 (0.88) 1.27 (1.44) 1.17 (3.67)*** 
LABCO 1.43 (3.01)*** 0.32 (0.66) 2.39 (3.17)*** 0.98 (4.25)*** 
COST -0.004  
(-3.27)*** 
-0.011  
(-5.14)*** 
-0.005  
(-2.91)*** 
-0.005  
(-7.21)*** 
Standard deviations of parameter distributions (t-ratio) 
sdTRAIN 2.58 (4.23)*** 3.02 (4.02)*** 2.44 (2.74)*** 2.15 (7.21)*** 
sdMKI 0.40 (0.45) 3.13 (3.46)*** 1.98 (2.19)** 1.35 (2.79)*** 
sdMKIC 1.52 (1.95)* 2.13 (2.86)*** 2.39 (2.78)*** 1.48 (3.85)*** 
sdCOMPEN 0.04 (2.51)** 0.03 (1.79)* 0.03 (1.05) 0.04 (3.32)*** 
sdLABC 0.12 (0.10) 0.31 (0.46) 0.23 (0.21) 0.17 (0.70) 
sdLABCO 1.00 (1.34) 1.20 (1.63) 0.48 (0.64) 0.57 (0.18) 
Log-likelihood  -179.99 -253.65 -115.12 -577.43 
Adjusted 
pseudo-R
2
 
0.40 0.36 0.35 0.35 
n (respondents) 110 137 66 313 
n (choices) 440 548 264 1,252 
Notes: Statistical significance levels: ***1%; **5%; *10%. Corresponding t-ratios are shown in 
parentheses. 
 
The estimated models for the separate production systems, as well as the pooled sample, all 
exhibit good explanatory power (pseudo-R
2 
values between 35 percent and 40 percent). All the 
attribute coefficients (except labelling cattle with or without owner’s identity) have highly 
significant standard deviations, implying that there are, indeed, heterogeneous preferences for these 
attributes. The estimated means and standard deviations of the normally distributed coefficients also 
provide information on the probability distribution of the population according to the proportion 
that places a positive value on a particular attribute and the proportion that places a negative value 
on it. Generally, over 90% of farmers had a positive preference for each of the attributes included in 
the CE. Somewhat unexpected is a small proportion (around 9%) that had a negative preference for 
compensation, but this may be an artefact of the normal distribution. A majority of farmers clearly 
preferred the DFZ attributes included in the CE, suggesting that collectively these attributes fully 
captured respondents’ preference range for DFZs. 
The WTP results confirm that farmers have heterogeneous preferences for all the DFZ 
attributes (Table 5). In the pooled sample, farmers are willing to pay between Kshs 733 and Kshs 
900 per animal annually for inclusion of training in a DFZ (less than 10% of the value of an 
animal); Kshs 491 to Kshs 638 for provision of market information only; Kshs 580 to Kshs 731 for 
provision of market information and sales contract guarantee; Kshs 8 to Kshs 11 for compensation 
per one percent of the value of cattle lost due to a disease occurrence; Kshs 159 to Kshs 279 for 
labelling of cattle without showing owner’s identity; and Kshs 140 to Kshs 229 with owner’s 
identity
5
. On the basis of the WTP values, farmers’ ranking of preferences is: training; market 
                                                 
5
 The estimated WTP values for all the DFZ attributes seem reasonable, given that average prices of cattle in the study 
sites at the time of survey were between Kshs 10,000 and Kshs 30,000. Cattle prices in Kenya generally vary depending 
on the animal body condition, breed, type of market and purpose of buying, amongst other factors (Randeny et al., 
2006). 
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information and contract; market information only; labelling cattle only; and labelling cattle with 
owner’s identity.6 
 
 
Table 5: Marginal WTP estimates for DFZ attributes (Kshs)* 
Variable Marginal WTP (95% confidence interval) 
Nomads Agro-pastoralists Ranchers Pooled sample 
TRAIN 1,273.2 
(938.0 – 1,608.0)ξ 
596.6 
(532.7 – 660.4) 
1,038.4 
(768.5 – 1,308.4) 
816.3 
(732.7 – 899.9) 
MKI 815.3 
(577.0 – 1,053.5) 
391.8 
(331.9 – 451.7) 
660.6 
(435.7 – 885.5) 
564.5 
(491.2 – 637.8) 
MKIC 994.4 
(715.0 – 1,273.7) 
450.0 
(395.4 – 504.6) 
1,072.7 
(773.9 – 1,371.4) 
655.3 
(579.6 – 731.0) 
COMPEN 15.0 
(10.3 – 19.7) 
5.6 
(4.4 – 6.8) 
12.3 
(8.6 – 16.0) 
9.1 
(7.7 – 10.5) 
LABC 595.0 
(363.5 – 826.5) 
41.2 
ψ
 
 
(-5.1 – 87.4) 
257.2 
 (73.6 – 440.8) 
218.9 
(159.2 – 278.6) 
LABCO 376.4 
(239.7 – 513.0) 
28.7 
ψ  
(-15.6 – 73.1) 
481.9 
(316.0 – 647.9) 
184.1 
(139.5 – 228.7) 
Notes: 
ψ
 not significant at 5% level. 
ξ
 confidence intervals have been calculated from standard errors estimated using the delta method in 
LIMDEP version 9.0/NLOGIT version 4.0 (Greene, 2007). 
* Average prices of cattle in the study sites at the time of survey were between Kshs 10,000 and 
Kshs 30,000. 
 
On average, nomads and ranchers are willing to pay relatively more than the agro-
pastoralists for training, to enable them to implement some of the requirements of the DFZ, such as 
monitoring and reporting of disease occurrence. This may reflect differences in current access to 
livestock extension and veterinary advisory services (see Table 2) and, for the nomads, limited 
opportunities of acquiring cattle production skills in formal livestock-specific training schemes. 
However, all three farmer types exhibit preference for training in the DFZ, which might suggest that 
the existing formal education and livestock development programmes are inadequate. As expected, 
the inclusion of contract guarantee in market support raises the WTP across all production systems. 
The agro-pastoralists’ lower WTP for compensation may indicate that, in the absence of 
compensation, they would still be able to achieve reasonable returns from their more diversified 
enterprises, compared to the nomads and ranchers. The results also show that agro-pastoralists do 
not prefer labelling of cattle with or without the owner’s identity. This could be associated with 
their small farms, hence a preference to continue practicing open grazing (while concealing identity 
to avoid penalties in case of encroachment/trespass). Similarly, the nomads would be willing to pay 
more for labelling cattle only than for labelling with owner’s identity, perhaps implying that they, 
too, prefer some degree of open grazing and anonymity. In order to prevent infection of cattle in a 
DFZ and potential collapse of the programme, it would be necessary to ensure that farmers in these 
two production systems adopt controlled grazing. Ranchers would be willing to pay more for 
labelling cattle with their identities than without.  This reflects the current situation where most 
ranchers already practice some form of cattle labelling and confined grazing, and suggests that they 
would fully support traceability of cattle as a key DFZ attribute. 
  
                                                 
6
 Compensation is not included in the preference ranking because it was entered in the model as a percentage, whereas 
the other variables were binary. 
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The implementation of a DFZ would be expected to involve a combination of attributes. To 
illustrate how farmers in different production systems might respond to different combinations, we 
derive compensating surplus (CS) estimates (see equation 9) for six possible policy scenarios (Table 
6). The CS estimates for all the scenarios considered are positive, suggesting that generally farmers 
prefer a change from the baseline of no DFZ. However, the CS estimates are significantly different 
across the three production systems for scenarios 1, 2, 3 and 5, with nomads having the highest CS 
and agro-pastoralists the lowest. The CS estimates for scenarios 4 and 6 are not statistically 
different between nomads and ranchers, but higher than for the agro-pastoralists. Generally, nomads 
and ranchers have higher and similar CS across all DFZ scenarios, while for agro-pastoralists the 
estimates are much lower. Given that nomads and ranchers derive most of their income from 
livestock (see Table 2), it might be expected that they are willing to invest more in DFZs. Scenario 
4 is the most preferred by farmers in all three production systems. Scenario 2 is the least preferred 
by the nomads, and scenario 3 the least preferred by both the agro-pastoralists and ranchers. Across 
and within all three production systems, the CS estimates are higher where the scenarios have an 
element of training (scenarios 1, 4, 5 and 6). This is consistent with the low levels of formal 
education and relatively limited access to livestock extension services noted earlier, and further 
underlines the importance of incorporating training in a DFZ policy design. In addition, scenarios 4 
and 6, with larger CS, include market information and contract, which confirms the high preference 
noted earlier for this attribute (see Table 5). 
Selection of a DFZ scenario for implementation will depend on relative resource availability 
and the priorities of other key stakeholders (e.g., the government). Assuming the unlikely situation 
of resource abundance and convergence of stakeholder interests towards a ‘one size fits all’ policy, 
scenario 4 would appear a good choice. Alternatively, the CS estimates could be used together with 
other practical considerations, e.g. existing institutional capacity and regulatory framework, in 
choosing a scenario to implement. It might also be worthwhile to consider a phased implementation, 
starting with the most preferred features and/or production systems where the CS is highest. We 
envisage that implementation in any area would be administered through a local management 
committee comprising farmers’ representatives and other stakeholders. This committee would, for 
instance, identify competitive (public or private) providers of services, such as training, and pay for 
those services from its account. 
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Table 6: Attribute levels and compensating surplus for DFZ policy scenarios (in Kshs) 
Scenar
io 
Attribute Compensating surplus in the production systems 
 
T
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n
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n
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en
tity
  
N
o
m
ad
s 
A
g
ro
-p
asto
ralists 
R
an
ch
ers 
P
o
o
led
 sam
p
le 
1    10   2,833.3a 
(737.8) 
1,085.7
c
 
(111.3) 
2,079.0
b
 
(562.0) 
1,691.0 
(175.7) 
2    50   1,941.1a 
(512.9) 
701.5
c
 
(79.1) 
1,756.6
b
 
(463.0) 
1,204.9 
(128.1) 
3    25   1,964.1a 
(530.7) 
631.6
c
 
(72.0) 
1,636.9
b
 
(437.0) 
1,102.3 
(121.7) 
4    25   3,018.6a 
(775.4) 
1,215.8
b
 
(117.9) 
2,900.1
a
 
(745.7) 
1,883.9 
(185.3) 
5    10   2,614.7a 
(674.8) 
1,073.3
c
 
(110.9) 
2,303.8
b
 
(607.0) 
1,656.2 
(167.5) 
6    10   2,793.8a 
(726.5) 
1,131.5
b
 
(115.3) 
2,715.8
a
 
(711.2) 
1,747.0 
(176.0) 
Notes:  indicates the attribute is present in a scenario at the non-zero level. 
a,b,c
 differences in the superscripts denote significant differences, at 5% level, in CS across the 
production systems.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. All CS estimates are significant at 1% level. 
 
5 Conclusions 
This study has focused on analysis of farmer preferences for DFZs and provides insights into policy 
and future research on the design of such programmes. Results show that Kenyan farmers prefer the 
establishment of effective DFZs in order to help them manage disease challenges in cattle 
production. Compared to the current disease control programmes, farmers would prefer to have a 
DFZ in which: they are provided with adequate training on pasture development, record keeping 
and disease monitoring skills; market information is provided and sales contract opportunities are 
guaranteed; cattle are properly labelled for ease of identification; some monetary compensation is 
provided in case cattle die due to severe disease outbreaks. The design of DFZs should therefore 
include these features to enhance the acceptability of such programmes.    
Results also show that there is heterogeneity in farmer preferences across production 
systems. Because of their relatively high dependence on cattle for income, nomads and ranchers are 
willing to pay more in order to have market information and contract included in the DFZ. Farmers 
in these two production systems also have a higher WTP for compensation. There are also 
variations across the production systems in WTP for training, perhaps due to differences in access 
to livestock extension and veterinary advisory services and levels of sedentarisation.   
In order to ensure acceptance of cattle traceability among the agro-pastoralists and nomads, 
it appears important to emphasize that inclusion of cattle owner’s identity in the labelling is not 
meant to penalize farmers for trespass, but rather is a key element in enhancing disease control. 
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Moreover, improving farmers’ understanding of the purpose of each attribute is important for a 
DFZ programme, whose successful implementation requires collective farmer participation.  
We also derive farmers’ preferences for various DFZ policy scenarios. Across the 
production systems, there is higher preference for scenarios that incorporate training. The estimates 
of compensating surplus (along with other factors such as resource availability and stakeholder 
priorities) should help in choosing the best scenario to implement in a particular system or for the 
entire cattle sub-sector. Also, appropriate institutional and regulatory frameworks should be 
established in order to facilitate co-ordination of DFZ services (from public and/or private 
providers) by the management committee, and to enhance monitoring of implementation. 
Future research on DFZs could focus on analysing the total costs and benefits of 
implementing different DFZ policy scenarios, and possible resource contributions from other 
stakeholders. Complementary application of orthogonality and efficiency criteria is also deserving 
of further investigation in improving the statistical appeal of CE designs. 
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